


Attribute Transformation for Attribute-Based Access Control


Prosunjit Biswas, Ravi Sandhu and Ram Krishnan
Department of Computer Science
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Texas, San Antonio

ABAC'17, March 24, 2017, Scottsdale, AZ, USA

- Summary
- Motivation
- Attribute Transformation
- Attribute Reduction
- Attribute Expansion
- Conclusion
- Q/A



We have presented a concept of attribute transformation and specify two types of transformation---attribute reduction and attribute expansion.



Attribute explosion!





Figure 1: Attributes defined for OpenStack Virtual Machines



Attribute Explosion

incurs

difficulties in managing

authorization policies


attribute-value assignments

We cannot get rid of attributes we need.

But we can manage

with

Attribute Transformation



Assumptions:

Non-policy Attributes \cap Policy Attributes = ϕ
Non-policy Attributes \gg Policy Attributes


Examples:

Object attributes (Non-policy):
size, created_by, shared, location


Object attributes (Policy):
sensitivity, security-label

Attribute Transformation is the process of transforming one set of attribute-value assignments into another set of assignments.


Types of attribute transformation





The process of transforming non-policy attribute-value assignments into policy attributes-value assignments.



Motivation from literature:





Authorization policy with Policy attributes:

Can-read \equiv security-label(o) = sensitive \wedge role(u)=manager

Mapping rules with Non-policy Attributes:

VM-mapping \equiv resource-type(o) = VM \wedge image-type(o) = corporate \rightarrow
security-label(o) = sensitive

Firewall-mapping \equiv resource-type(o) = firewall \wedge protocol(o) = UDP \wedge
network(o) = internal \rightarrow security-label(o) = sensitive

Example of mapping rule:


file-length(f) = 100 MB \wedge created-by(f) = system-d \wedge is-shared(f) = false \rightarrow security-label(f) = sensitive




Table 1: Mapping rules

<p>I. The terminal symbols $\wedge, =, \rightarrow,$ $oa_1, oa_2, \dots, oa_k,$ $oav_1, oav_2, \dots, oav_l,$ $ua_1, ua_2, \dots, ua_m,$ $uav_1, uav_2, \dots, uav_n$</p> <p>II. The non-terminal symbols ObjAttrValAssgn, UsrAttrValAssgn, ObjAttrValExpr, UsrAttrValExpr, ObjAttrValPair, UsrAttrValPair, ObjAttr, UsrAttr, UsrAttrValue, ObjAttrValue</p> <p>III. The start symbol MappingRule</p> <p>IV. The production rules (in BNF notation) MappingRule ::= ObjAttrValAssgn \rightarrow ObjAttrValAssgn UsrAttrValAssgn \rightarrow UsrAttrValAssgn ObjAttrValAssgn ::= ObjAttrValExpr UsrAttrValAssgn ::= UsrAttrValExpr ObjAttrValExpr ::= ObjAttrValPair ObjAttrValExpr \wedge ObjAttrValExpr UsrAttrValExpr ::= UsrAttrValPair UsrAttrValExpr \wedge UsrAttrValExpr ObjAttrValPair ::= ObjAttr = ObjAttrValue UsrAttrValPair ::= UsrAttr = UsrAttrValue ObjAttr ::= $oa_1 oa_2 \dots oa_k$ ObjAttrValue ::= $oav_1 oav_2 \dots oav_l$ UsrAttr ::= $ua_1 ua_2 \dots ua_m$ UsrAttrValue ::= $uav_1 uav_2 \dots uav_n$</p>
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
Conflicts resulting from multiple mappings



Conflicts resulting from assigned and derived values



The process of transforming policy-attribute-value assignments into a different set of policy-attributes-value assignments.



Motivation from literature:

1. Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control (HGABAC) [3]



What next?

- Other forms of Attribute Transformation
- Chain of Attribute Transformation
- Fitting Attribute Transformation in ABAC models



1. Servos, Daniel, and Sylvia L. Osborn. "HGABAC: Towards a formal model of hierarchical attribute-based access control." International Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security. Springer International Publishing, 2014.
2. Kuhn, D. Richard, Edward J. Coyne, and Timothy R. Weil. "Adding attributes to role-based access control." Computer 43.6 (2010): 79-81.
3. Servos, Daniel, and Sylvia L. Osborn. "HGABAC: Towards a formal model of hierarchical attribute-based access control." International Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security. Springer International Publishing, 2014.

