


INFS 767 Fall 2003

The RBAC96 Model

Prof. Ravi Sandhu
George Mason University

THE OM-AM WAY



© Ravi Sandhu

4

AUTHORIZATION, TRUST AND RISK

- ❖ Information security is fundamentally about managing
 - > authorization and
 - > trust
- so as to manage risk

© Ravi Sandhu

2

LAYERS AND LAYERS

- ❖ Multics rings
- ❖ Layered abstractions
- ❖ Waterfall model
- ❖ Network protocol stacks
- ❖ OM-AM

© Ravi Sandhu

5


SOLUTIONS

- ❖ OM-AM
- ❖ RBAC
- ❖ PKI
- ❖ and others

© Ravi Sandhu

3

OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)



© Ravi Sandhu

6

OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)

What?



How?

Owner-based discretion
numerous
numerous
ACLs, Capabilities, etc

A
S
S
U
R
A
N
C
E

WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC?

- ❖ RBAC is a framework to help in articulating policy
- ❖ The main point of RBAC is to facilitate security management

OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

What?



How?

Policy neutral
RBAC96
user-pull, server-pull, etc.
certificates, tickets, PACs, etc.

A
S
S
U
R
A
N
C
E

RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES

- ❖ least privilege
- ❖ separation of duties
- ❖ separation of administration and access
- ❖ abstract operations

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

- ❖ A user's permissions are determined by the user's roles
 - rather than identity or clearance
 - roles can encode arbitrary attributes
- ❖ multi-faceted
- ❖ ranges from very simple to very sophisticated


RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb. 1996

- ❖ Policy neutral
- ❖ can be configured to do MAC
 - roles simulate clearances (ESORICS 96)
- ❖ can be configured to do DAC
 - roles simulate identity (RBAC98)

WHAT IS RBAC?

- ❖ multidimensional
- ❖ open ended
- ❖ ranges from simple to sophisticated

RBAC0




RBAC CONUNDRUM

- ❖ turn on all roles all the time
- ❖ turn on one role only at a time
- ❖ turn on a user-specified subset of roles

PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **Primitive permissions**
 - read, write, append, execute
- ❖ **Abstract permissions**
 - credit, debit, inquiry

RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS



PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **System permissions**
 - Auditor
- ❖ **Object permissions**
 - read, write, append, execute, credit, debit, inquiry

PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **Permissions are positive**
- ❖ **No negative permissions or denials**
 - negative permissions and denials can be handled by constraints
- ❖ **No duties or obligations**
 - outside scope of access control

USERS

- ❖ **Users are**
 - human beings or
 - other active agents
- ❖ **Each individual should be known as exactly one user**

ROLES AS POLICY

- ❖ **A role brings together**
 - a collection of users and
 - a collection of permissions
- ❖ **These collections will vary over time**
 - A role has significance and meaning beyond the particular users and permissions brought together at any moment

USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

- ❖ **A user can be a member of many roles**
- ❖ **Each role can have many users as members**

ROLES VERSUS GROUPS

- ❖ **Groups are often defined as**
 - a collection of users
- ❖ **A role is**
 - a collection of users and
 - a collection of permissions
- ❖ **Some authors define role as**
 - a collection of permissions


SESSIONS

- ❖ **A user can invoke multiple sessions**
- ❖ **In each session a user can invoke any subset of roles that the user is a member of**

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

- ❖ A permission can be assigned to many roles
- ❖ Each role can have many permissions


HIERARCHICAL ROLES




MANAGEMENT OF RBAC

- ❖ Option 1: **USER-ROLE-ASSIGNMENT** and **PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT** can be changed only by the chief security officer
- ❖ Option 2: Use RBAC to manage RBAC


HIERARCHICAL ROLES




RBAC1



PRIVATE ROLES



EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



© Ravi Sandhu

31


EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



© Ravi Sandhu

34


EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



© Ravi Sandhu

32


RBAC3



© Ravi Sandhu

35

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



© Ravi Sandhu

33

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Mutually Exclusive Roles

- **Static Exclusion:** The same individual can never hold both roles
- **Dynamic Exclusion:** The same individual can never hold both roles in the same context

© Ravi Sandhu

36

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Mutually Exclusive Permissions

- **Static Exclusion:** The same role should never be assigned both permissions
- **Dynamic Exclusion:** The same role can never hold both permissions in the same context

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Cardinality Constraints on User-Role Assignment

- At most k users can belong to the role
- At least k users must belong to the role
- Exactly k users must belong to the role

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Cardinality Constraints on Permissions-Role Assignment

- At most k roles can get the permission
- At least k roles must get the permission
- Exactly k roles must get the permission