


The RCL2000 Language for Specifying Role-Based Authorization Constraints

Gail-Joon Ahn

RBAC96



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4

ABSTRACT

- ❖ **This presentation includes**
 - The first formal (and intuitive) language for role-based authorization constraints
 - A formal semantics for this language
 - Demonstration of the expressive power of the language
 - Characterization of role-based constraints into prohibition and obligation constraints

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2


SEPARATION OF DUTY (1)

- ❖ **SOD is fundamental technique for preventing fraud and errors**
- ❖ **Related Work**
 - Enumerate several forms of SOD
 - Little work on specifying SOD in a comprehensive way

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SEPARATION OF DUTY (2)



PURCHASING
MANAGER

ACCOUNTING PAYABLE
MANAGER


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PROHIBITION

- ❖ Separation of Duty constraints

BIG PICTURE



OBLIGATION

- ❖ Every faculty member must be assigned to at least one departmental committee

WHO IS THE USER

- ❖ Security Researcher
- ❖ Security Policy Designer
- ❖ Security Architect

RESEARCH PLAN

- ❖ Need to specify these constraints
 - Language
- ❖ Show the meaning of expression
 - Formal semantics
- ❖ Expressive power of the language
 - Well-known constraints and simulations
- ❖ Analysis of the work
 - Characterization

RCL 2000

- ❖ RCL 2000 (Role-based Constraints Language 2000)
- ❖ Specification Language
 - to formally express constraints in role-based systems
- ❖ Most components are built upon RBAC96

BASIC ELEMENT (from RBAC96)

- ❖ **U** : a set of users
- ❖ **R** : a set of roles
 - $RH \hat{=} R \hat{=} R$: role hierarchy
- ❖ **OBJ** : a set of objects
- ❖ **OP** : a set of operations
- ❖ $P = OP \hat{=} OBJ$: a set of permissions
- ❖ **S** : a set of sessions

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BASIC ELEMENT (beyond RBAC96)

- ❖ **CR** : all conflicting role sets
- ❖ **CU** : all conflicting user sets
- ❖ **CP** : all conflicting permission sets

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BASIC ELEMENT (from RBAC96)

- ❖ **UA** : a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation
- ❖ **PA** : a many-to-many permissions-to-role assignment relation

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BASIC ELEMENT (beyond RBAC96)

- ❖ **CR1** : all conflicting role sets
- ❖ **CR2** : all conflicting role sets
- ❖ **CR3** : all conflicting role sets
- ❖

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SYSTEM FUNCTIONS (from RBAC96)

- ❖ **user** : $R \otimes 2^U$
- ❖ **roles, roles*** : $U \hat{=} P \hat{=} S \otimes 2^R$
- ❖ **sessions** : $U \otimes 2^S$
- ❖ **permissions, permissions*** :
 $R \otimes 2^P$
- ❖ **operations** : $R \hat{=} OBJ \otimes 2^{OP}$
- ❖ **object** : $P \otimes 2^{OBJ}$

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
NON-DETERMINISTIC FUNCTIONS (beyond RBAC96)

- ❖ introduced by Chen and Sandhu (1995)
- ❖ **oneelement (OE)**
 - $oneelement(X) = x_i$, where $x_i \hat{=} X$
- ❖ **allother (AO)**
 - $allother(X) = X - \{OE(X)\}$
 $= X - \{x_i\}$
 - should occur along with OE function

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SYNTAX



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REDUCTION ALGORITHM

$OE(OE(CR)) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright AO(OE(CR)) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$

1. $OE(OE(CR)) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (OE(CR) - \{OE(OE(CR))\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
2. $" cr \hat{I} CR : OE(cr) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (cr - \{OE(cr)\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
3. $" cr \hat{I} CR, " r \hat{I} cr : r \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (cr - \{r\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
4. $" cr \hat{I} CR, " r \hat{I} cr, " u \hat{I} U : r \hat{I} \text{roles}(u) \triangleright (cr - \{r\}) \zeta \text{roles}(u) = \mathcal{E}$

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EXAMPLES OF CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

Conflicting roles cannot have common users

- > $|\text{roles}(OE(U)) \zeta OE(CR)| \neq 1$

Conflicting users cannot have common roles

- > $|\text{roles}(OE(OE(CU))) \zeta \text{roles}(AO(OE(CU)))| = f$

Users cannot activate two conflicting roles

- > $|\text{roles}(\text{sessions}(OE(U))) \zeta OE(CR)| \neq 1$

Users cannot activate two conflicting roles in a single session

- > $|\text{roles}(OE(\text{sessions}(OE(U)))) \zeta OE(CR)| \neq 1$

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RFOPL STRUCTURE

- ❖ **sequence part : predicate**
- ❖ $" r \hat{I} R, " u \hat{I} U : r \hat{I} \text{roles}(u)$
- ❖ $" x_2 \hat{I} x_1, " x_3 \hat{I} x_2, " x_4 \hat{I} x_3 : \text{predicate}$

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FORMAL SEMANTICS

❖ Reduction Algorithm

- > to convert a constraint expression to a restricted form of first order predicate logic (RFOPL)

❖ Construction Algorithm

- > to construct a constraint expression from RFOPL

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CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM

$" cr \hat{I} CR, " r \hat{I} cr, " u \hat{I} U : r \hat{I} \text{roles}(u) \triangleright (cr - \{r\}) \zeta \text{roles}(u) = \mathcal{E}$

1. $" cr \hat{I} CR, " r \hat{I} cr : r \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (cr - \{r\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
2. $" cr \hat{I} CR : OE(cr) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (cr - \{OE(cr)\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
3. $OE(OE(CR)) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright (OE(CR) - \{OE(OE(CR))\}) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$
4. $OE(OE(CR)) \hat{I} \text{roles}(OE(U)) \triangleright AO(OE(CR)) \zeta \text{roles}(OE(U)) = \mathcal{E}$

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SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS

- ❖ **Theorem 1** Given RCL2000 expression a , a can be translated into RFOPL expression b . Also a can be reconstructed from b .

$$C(R(a)) = a$$

- ❖ **Theorem 2** Given RFOPL expression b , b can be translated into RCL2000 expression a . Also b' which is logically equivalent to b can be reconstructed from a .

$$R(C(b)) = b'$$

PERMISSION-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

❖ SSOD-CP

- $|permissions(roles(OE(U))) \subseteq OE(CP)| \models 1$

❖ Variations of SSOD-CP

- **SSOD-CP Û**
 $|permissions(OE(R)) \subseteq OE(CP)| \models 1$

SEPARATION OF DUTY CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Specification of SOD constraints identified by Simon and Zurko (1997) and formulated by Virgil et al (1998)**
- ❖ **Identify new SOD properties**
 - Role-centric
 - User-centric
 - Permission-centric

USER-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

❖ SSOD-CU (User-centric)

- **SSOD-CR Û** $|user(OE(CR)) \subseteq OE(CU)| \models 1$

ROLE-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

❖ Static SOD

: Conflicting roles cannot have common users

$$U = \{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\}, R = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\},$$

$$CR = \{cr_1, cr_2\} : cr_1 = \{r_1, r_2, r_3\}, cr_2 = \{r_a, r_b, r_c\}$$

- $|roles(OE(U)) \subseteq OE(CR)| \models 1$

DYNAMIC SOD

❖ User-based DSOD

- $|roles(sessions(OE(U))) \subseteq OE(CR)| \models 1$

❖ User-based DSOD with CU

- $|roles(sessions(OE(OE(CU)))) \subseteq OE(CR)| \models 1$

❖ Session-based DSOD

- $|roles(OE(sessions(OE(U)))) \subseteq OE(CR)| \models 1$

❖ Session-based DSOD with CU

- $|roles(OE(sessions(OE(OE(CU)))) \subseteq OE(CR)| \models 1$


CASE STUDIES

- ❖ **Lattice-based access control**
 - Ravi Sandhu (1993, 1996)
- ❖ **Chinese Wall policy**
 - Ravi Sandhu (1992)
- ❖ **Discretionary access control**
 - Sandhu and Munawer (1998)

PROHIBITION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Forbid the RBAC component from doing (or being) something which is not allowed to do (or be)**
 - Separation of duty constraints

LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL



- ❖ Subject s can write object o only if $l(s) \leq l(o)$
- ❖ Subject s can read object o only if $l(o) \leq l(s)$

Constraints on UA: Each user is assigned to exactly two roles xR and LW

OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS


- ❖ **Force the RBAC component to do (or be) something**
 - LBAC-RBAC, Chinese Wall-RBAC simulation

LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

- $AR = \{ar1, ar2\}$
 - $ar1 = \{HR, HW\}$, $ar2 = \{LR, LW\}$
- $ASR = \{asr1, asr2\}$
 - $asr1 = \{HR, LW\}$, $asr2 = \{LR, LW\}$

- ❖ **Constraint on UA:**
 - $roles(OE(U)) = OE(ASR)$
- ❖ **Constraint on sessions:**
 - $roles(OE(sessions(OE(U)))) = OE(AR)$

CONSTRAINTS CHARACTERIZATION



SIMPLE PROHIBITION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Type 1**
 - $\frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2}\text{f} 1$
- ❖ **Type 2**
 - $expr = f$ or $\frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2} = 0$
- ❖ **Type 3**
 - $\frac{1}{2}expr 1 \frac{1}{2} < \frac{1}{2}expr 2 \frac{1}{2}$

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FUTURE WORK

- ❖ **Extension of RCL 2000**
 - Applying it the formalization of some realistic security policies
- ❖ **Implementation Issue**
 - Tool for checking syntax and semantic as well as visualization of specification
- ❖ **Enforcement of constraints**

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SIMPLE OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Type 1**
 - $expr \frac{1}{2} 0$ or $\frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2} > 0$
- ❖ **Type 2**
 - **Set X = Set Y**
- ❖ **Type 3**
 - obligation constraints \supset obligation constraints
- ❖ **Type 4**
 - $\frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2} = 1$
 - $\frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2} = 1 \circ \frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2}\text{f} 1 \cup \frac{1}{2}expr \frac{1}{2} > 0$

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38

CONTRIBUTIONS

- ❖ **Developed the first formal and intuitive language for role-based authorization constraints**
- ❖ **Provided a formal semantics for this language**
- ❖ **Demonstrated the expressive power of the language by**
 - specifying well-known separation of duty constraints
 - identifying new role-based SOD constraints
 - showing how to specify constraints identified in the simulations of other policies in RBAC
- ❖ **Characterized role-based constraints into prohibition and obligation constraints**

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39