

Extending OpenStack Access Control with Domain Trust

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**Anytime
Anywhere**

➤ Driving force:

- ❖ Anytime, Anywhere (Centralized infrastructure)
- ❖ [\$\$\$] -----> [\$|\$|\$] (Shared resources)
- ❖ Pay-on-the-go (On-demand services)
- ❖ Scalable and flexible

➤ Resistance:

❖ Security & Privacy

- Data governance
- Access control

❖ Other problems

- Data Locked-in
- Lack Standard APIs

➤ Open source Cloud platform

- ❖ 12,000 individual members
- ❖ 260 supporting organizations
- ❖ 130 countries



➤ Havana Release

- ❖ Nov. 2013 - Hong Kong Summit



➤ Keystone (IAM)

- ❖ Identity API v3
- ❖ Introduction of Domain concept

Source: <http://www.openstack.org/software/havana/press-release>

➤ Multi-tenancy

❖ From Cloud Service Provider (CSP) perspective


- A billing customer, isolated with each other
- Manages its own users and cloud resources

❖ The owner of a tenant can be

- An individual, an organization or a department in an organization, etc.

➤ Domain in OpenStack


❖ Each domain manages its own users and projects



➤ Trust

- ❖ Active Directory Federation Service (AD FS)
 - Multiple types of federation trust among domains
- ❖ Cross-account trust in AWS
 - Unilateral trust with another account or external credentials
- ❖ Trust in OpenStack
 - User to user delegation via roles

- Standardized APIs
 - ❖ Cross-tenant accesses are functionally available
- Properly authenticated users
- One Cloud Service
 - ❖ Of a kind: IaaS, PaaS or SaaS.
 - ❖ Multi-tenancy collaboration on a single cloud



➤ Roles


- ❖ Globally available
- ❖ Not owned by domains or projects

➤ Tokens

- ❖ Credentials issued to authenticated users
- ❖ Will expire, similar to session concept in RBAC

➤ Services

- ❖ Examples: Nova, Glance, Neutron
- ❖ Different services have different policies based on the role-permission assignments



```
rule:add_user_to_project -> (role:keystone_admin ||  
  (role:project_admin && project_id:%(target_project_id)s) ||  
  (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s))
```

```
rule:add_project_to_domain -> (role:keystone_admin ||  
  (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s))
```

Source: <https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Domains>

➤ Basic scenario

- ❖ User: u1 from Domain: d1

- ❖ Project: p2 from Domain: d2

➤ Cross-domain actions


- ❖ Administrative


 - Assign u1 to roles in p2

- ❖ Operational


 - Allowing u1 to access p2 with the assigned roles

- ❖ Require proper trust relation between d1 and d2





- Two-party unilateral unidirectional non-transitive
 - ❖ Type- α , requires visibility of the trustee's user information for the trustor to assign trustee's users to roles in trustor's projects, written as " \triangleleft_{α} ".
 - ❖ Type- β , requires the trustor to expose its user information for the trustee to assign trustor's users to roles in trustee's projects, written as " \triangleleft_{β} ".
 - ❖ Type- γ , requires the trustor to expose its project information for the trustee to assign trustee's users to roles in trustor's projects, written as " \triangleleft_{γ} ".



➤ Constraints

❖ Separation of Duties (SoD)

- Mutually exclusive domain list

❖ Minimum Exposure

- Limit exposure of project and user to other domains

❖ Cardinality


- Limit the number of domains to be trusted

➤ Domain Trust Administration


❖ The trustor manages the trust relation and constraints

- Type- γ trust
 - ❖ Trustee manages cross-domain assignments
 - ❖ Implemented as a extension module in Keystone
- Experiment Environment
 - ❖ 1 unit = 1 CPU/1GB
 - ❖ VMs with 1, 2, 4, 8 units of capability
 - ❖ Devstack deployed in cloud environment
 - ❖ Stand-alone Keystone service
 - ❖ Test with REST API calls through curl commands

- Sequential request handling (Queuing)
 - ❖ Domain trust introduces 0.7% authz. Overhead
 - ❖ Scalability changes little with domain trust



Performance



Scalability

➤ RBAC extensions

- ❖ Centralized authority is usually required

 - ROBAC, collaboration not supported

 - GB-RBAC, group does not own users

➤ Role-Based Delegation models

- ❖ Delegation chain lacks support of agile entities

➤ Multi-Domain Interoperation

- ❖ Role-mapping requires PA to be domain-specific

➤ Multi-Tenant Access Control models

- ❖ MTAS, MT-RBAC, CTTM

- Formalized OSAC model
 - ❖ Administrative model (AOSAC)
- Trust Framework & Trust Types
- Formalized OSAC-DT model
 - ❖ Administrative model (AOSAC-DT) & Constraints
- Implementation & Experiments in OpenStack
 - ❖ Acceptable performance & scalability change
- Future work
 - ❖ Hierarchical Multi-tenancy model
 - ❖ Attribute-based models
 - ❖ Implementation in future OpenStack

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Q & A



Thank You!