

The GURAG Administrative Model for User and Group Attribute Assignment

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10th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS)
September 28-30, 2016

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
➤ Attribute Based Access Control


- ❖ requires attributes of entities to make access control decisions.
- ❖ provides flexible and fine grained access control
- ❖ needs attributes (characteristics of entities) to be assigned by security administrators before access policies can be enforced.

➤ Several models have been developed

- ❖ ABAC_α model [DBSec12]
- ❖ Attribute based encryption (ABE) [CCS06]
- ❖ Logical Based Framework for ABAC [FMSE04]
- ❖ Attributed based AC for web services [ICWS'05]
- ❖ Guide to ABAC Definitions and Considerations [NIST SP 800-162]
- ❖ etcetera!!

GURA (Single User, Single Attribute Value Assignment)






U: User
UG: User-Group
S: Subject
UA: User Attributes
O: Object
OG: Object-Group
OA: Object Attributes
OP: Operation (Actions)


➤ [Servos et al] proposed Hierarchical Group and Attribute based Access Control (HGABAC) operational model

- ❖ Introduces the notion of User and Object Groups
- ❖ Core advantage is simplified administration of attributes
- ❖ User and Objects are assigned set of attributes in one go as compared to single assignment at a time.



➤ **Senior Groups inherit attributes from junior group**

- ❖ Graduate group (G) is senior to CSD and UN
- ❖ G inherits attributes from both CSD and UN
- ❖ example: 'univId' and 'college' attribute for G inherited from UN and CSD
- ❖ User assigned to group G will have direct attributes and attributes from G



This paper proposes the first administration model for HGABAC model referred as **GURA_G**.

GURA_G Sub Models

- UAA:** User Attribute Assignment
- UGAA:** User Group Attribute Assignment
- UGA:** User to User-Group Assignment

Administrative Relations

– User Attribute Assignment (**UAA**) & User-Group Attribute Assignment (**UGAA**):

For each att_u in UA,

$$canAdd_{att_u} \subseteq AR \times \text{EXPR}(UA) \times 2^{\text{Range}(att_u)}$$

$$canDelete_{att_u} \subseteq AR \times \text{EXPR}(UA) \times 2^{\text{Range}(att_u)}$$

– User to User-Group Assignment (**UGA**):

$$canAssign \subseteq AR \times \text{EXPR}(UA \cup UG) \times 2^{UG}$$

$$canRemove \subseteq AR \times \text{EXPR}(UA \cup UG) \times 2^{UG}$$

➤ Example UAA rules

canAdd_{jobTitle} rule :
 (DeptAdmin, Grad \in effective_{studType}(u), {TA, Grader})

canDelete_{roomAcc} rule :
 (BuildAdmin, graduated \in effective_{studStatus}(u), {1.2, 2.03, 2.04, 3.02})

Administrative Role

Prerequisite Condition

Allowed values

Rule 1: Administrative Role DeptAdmin (or senior) can add any value in {TA, Grader} to user attribute 'jobTitle' if the user's 'studType' attribute includes 'Grad' value.


Common Policy Expression Language:

- $\alpha ::= \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \vee \alpha \mid (\alpha) \mid \neg \alpha \mid \exists x \in \text{set}.\alpha \mid \forall x \in \text{set}.\alpha \mid \text{set} \Delta \text{set} \mid \text{atomic} \in \text{set} \mid \text{atomic} \notin \text{set}$
- $\Delta ::= \subset \mid \subseteq \mid \not\subseteq \mid \cap \mid \cup$
- $\text{set} ::= \text{effective}_{\text{att}_{u_i}}(s) \mid \text{effective}_{\text{att}_{o_i}}(o)$ for $\text{att}_{u_i} \in \text{UA}, \text{att}_{o_i} \in \text{OA}$
- $\text{atomic} ::= \text{value}$

EXPR(UA) in UAA: $\text{set} ::= \text{att}_{u_i}(u) \mid \text{effective}_{\text{att}_{u_i}}(u) \mid \text{constantSet}$ for $\text{att}_{u_i} \in \text{UA}$
 $\text{atomic} ::= \text{constantAtomic}$

➤ Example UGAA rules

canAdd_{roomAcc} rule: (BuildAdmin, $COS \in college(ug)$, {2.04})
canAdd_{skills} rule: (DeptAdmin, $Grad \in studType(ug)$, {c++})
canDelete_{roomAcc} rule: (BuildAdmin, $2.04 \in roomAcc(ug)$, {3.02})



EXPR(UA) in UGAA:

set ::= $att_{u_i}(ug) \mid effectiveUG_{att_{u_i}}(ug) \mid constantSet$
 atomic ::= constantAtomic

for $att_{u_i} \in UA$

Example UGA canAssign rules:


Admin Role	Prereq. Cond	AllowedGroups
DeptAdmin	$\{c, java\} \subseteq \text{effective}_{\text{skills}}(u) \wedge S \notin \text{effectiveUg}(u)$	{G,CSD}
StaffAdmin	$\{G, UGR\} \cap \text{effectiveUg}(u) = \emptyset \wedge \text{Admin} \in \text{effective}_{\text{jobTitle}}(u)$	{S}
DeptAdmin	$U \in \text{directUg}(u) \wedge 3.02 \in \text{roomAcc}(u) \wedge S \notin \text{effectiveUg}(u)$	{UGR,CSD}

Example UGA canRemove rules:

Admin Role	Prereq. Cond	AllowedGroups
UniAdmin	$\text{graduated} \in \text{effective}_{\text{studStatus}}(u) \wedge \{G, UGR\} \cap \text{effectiveUg}(u) \neq \emptyset$	{G,UGR}
DeptAdmin	$\text{COS} \notin \text{effective}_{\text{college}}(u)$	{CSD}


**EXPR(UA U UG)
in UGA:**

$\text{set} ::= \text{att}_{u_i}(u) \mid \text{effective}_{\text{att}_{u_i}}(u) \mid \text{directUg}(u) \mid \text{effectiveUg}(u) \mid \text{constantSet}$
 $\text{atomic} ::= \text{constantAtomic}$
 where $\text{effectiveUg}(u) = \text{directUg}(u) \cup \left(\bigcup_{\forall \text{ug}_i \in \text{directUg}(u)} \{\text{ug}_j \mid \text{ug}_i \succeq_{\text{ug}} \text{ug}_j\} \right)$




Here the user has been assigned set of attributes by group G membership, in lieu of single attribute assignment, making attribute administration easy.

➤ Weak Removal versus Strong Removal




- ❖ **Weak Removal** will not impact implicit membership
 - After removal from CSD, user still inherits attribute of CSD through G.
- ❖ **Strong Removal** will remove both explicit and implicit memberships
 - User will be removed from G, if removed from CSD and authorized by rules.

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
➤ Inherited Value Deletion in User



Deleting an inherited value from a user will require to remove the membership of a user from all the user groups from where the value is inherited.

Note: Administrative Rules must exist to authorize operations.

➤ Inherited Value Deletion in User Group



Deleting an inherited value from a user group will require the deletion of value from all the junior groups which have value directly assigned.

➤ **Advantage:**

- ❖ Simplified distributed attribute administration.
- ❖ RBAC advantage inherited.

➤ **Limitations:**

- ❖ Cascading pre-assignment of attributes may lead to some values assignment not essentially required by the entity.
- ❖ UGA may require multiple pre-assignments of junior group to assign senior group, though the same inheritance can be achieved by senior group membership only.

➤ **Future Work:**

- ❖ Reachability Analysis for $GURAG$
- ❖ User and Object Group hierarchy administration.
- ❖ Attribute based User and Group attribute management.

Thank you!!
Any Questions??