



### Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

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
Lecture 7

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#### Authentication, Authorization, Audit








#### **Access Control**








Flexible policy















- Basic Abstractions
  - Subjects
  - Objects
  - Rights
- The rights in a cell specify the access of the subject (row) to the object (column)



## Users and Subjects




- A subject is a program (application) executing on behalf of a user
- A user may at any time be idle, or have one or more subjects executing on its behalf
- User-subject distinction is important if subject's rights are different from a user's rights
  - Usually a subset
  - In many systems a subject has all the rights of a user
- A human user may manifest as multiple users (accounts, principals) in the system



# Users and Subjects








# Users and Subjects








## **Objects**



- An object is anything on which a subject can perform operations (mediated by rights)
- > Usually objects are passive, for example:
  - ❖ File
  - Directory (or Folder)
  - Memory segment with CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete)
- > But, subjects can also be objects, with operations
  - **☆** kill
  - suspend
  - resume









### Implementation



- Access Control Lists
- Capabilities
- > Relations



### **Access Control Lists**



U:r U:w

U:r V:r V:w V:own

each column of the access matrix is stored with the object corresponding to that column



## Capabilities



U F/r, F/w, F/own, G/r

V G/r, G/w, G/own

each row of the access matrix is stored with the subject corresponding to that row



### Relations



Subject	Access	Object
U	r	F
U	W	F
U	own	F
U	r	G
V	r	G
V	W	G
V	own	G

commonly used in relational database management systems



# I-C-S ACLs versus Capabilities



- Authentication
  - ❖ ACL's require authentication of subjects and ACL integrity
  - Capabilities require integrity and propagation control
- Access review
  - ❖ ACL's are superior on a per-object basis
  - Capabilities are superior on a per-subject basis
- Revocation
  - ❖ ACL's are superior on a per-object basis
  - Capabilities are superior on a per-subject basis
- Least privilege
  - Capabilities provide for finer grained least privilege control with respect to subjects, especially dynamic short-lived subjects created for specific tasks



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Most Operating Systems use ACLs often in abbreviated form: owner, group, world



### Content-Dependent Controls



- > content dependent controls
  - ❖you can only see salaries less than 50K, or
  - you can only see salaries of employees who report to you
- beyond the scope of Operating Systems and are provided by Database Management Systems



### Context-Dependent Controls



- > context dependent controls
  - cannot access classified information via remote login
  - salary information can be updated only at year end
  - company's earnings report is confidential until announced at the stockholders meeting
- can be partially provided by the Operating System and partially by the Database Management System
- more sophisticated context dependent controls such as based on past history of accesses definitely require Database support



#### Trojan Horse Vulnerability of DAC



- Information from an object which can be read can be copied to any other object which can be written by a subject
- Suppose our users are trusted not to do this deliberately. It is still possible for Trojan Horses to copy information from one object to another.



#### Trojan Horse Vulnerability of DAC



ACL

File F

A:r

File G

B:r


A:w

User B cannot read file F



#### Trojan Horse Vulnerability of DAC





User B can read contents of file F copied to file G



## Copy Difference for rw



- Read of a digital copy is as good as read of original
- Write to a digital copy is not so useful



### **DAC Subtleties**



- Chains of grants and revokes
- > Inheritance of permissions
- Negative rights