

# The *RCL2000* Language for Specifying Role-Based Authorization Constraints

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## ABSTRACT


### ❖ This presentation includes

- The first formal (and intuitive) language for role-based authorization constraints
- A formal semantics for this language
- Demonstration of the expressive power of the language
- Characterization of role-based constraints into prohibition and obligation constraints

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
## RBAC96



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## RBAC96



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
## SEPARATION OF DUTY (1)

- ❖ SOD is fundamental technique for preventing fraud and errors
- ❖ Related Work
  - Enumerate several forms of SOD
  - Little work on specifying SOD in a comprehensive way

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## SEPARATION OF DUTY (2)



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## PROHIBITION

- ❖ Separation of Duty constraints

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## OBLIGATION

- ❖ Every faculty member must be assigned to at least one departmental committee

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
## RESEARCH PLAN

- ❖ Need to specify these constraints
  - Language
- ❖ Show the meaning of expression
  - Formal semantics
- ❖ Expressive power of the language
  - Well-known constraints and simulations
- ❖ Analysis of the work
  - Characterization

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## BIG PICTURE



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## WHO IS THE USER

- ❖ Security Researcher
- ❖ Security Policy Designer
- ❖ Security Architect

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## RCL 2000

- ❖ RCL 2000 (Role-based Constraints Language 2000)
- ❖ Specification Language
  - to formally express constraints in role-based systems
- ❖ Most components are built upon RBAC96

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## BASIC ELEMENT (from RBAC96)

- ❖ U : a set of users
  - ❖ R : a set of roles
    - RH ⊆ R  $\wedge$  R : role hierarchy
  - ❖ OBJ : a set of objects
  - ❖ OP : a set of operations
  - ❖ P = OP  $\wedge$  OBJ : a set of permissions
  - ❖ S : a set of sessions

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## BASIC ELEMENT (from RBAC96)

- ❖ UA : a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation
  - ❖ PA : a many-to-many permissions-to-role assignment relation

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## SYSTEM FUNCTIONS (from RBAC96)

- ❖ user : R ® 2<sup>U</sup>
  - ❖ roles : U È P È S ® 2<sup>R</sup>
  - ❖ sessions : U ® 2<sup>S</sup>
  - ❖ permissions : R ® 2<sup>P</sup>
  - ❖ operations : R ´ OBJ ® 2<sup>OP</sup>
  - ❖ object : P ® 2<sup>OBJ</sup>

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## BASIC ELEMENT (beyond RBAC96)

- ❖ CR : all conflicting role sets
  - ❖ CU : all conflicting user sets
  - ❖ CP : all conflicting permission sets

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
NON-DETERMINISTIC  
FUNCTIONS (beyond RBAC96)

- ❖ introduced by Chen and Sandhu (1995)
  - ❖ oneelement (OE)
    - $\text{oneelement}(X) = x_i$ , where  $x_i \in X$
  - ❖ allother (AO)
    - $\text{allother}(X) = X - \{\text{OE}(X)\}$
    - $= X - \{x_i\}$
  - should occur along with OE function

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## SYNTAX



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## EXAMPLES OF CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

Conflicting roles cannot have common users  
 ➤  $\lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \subset \text{OE(CR)} \rceil \leq 1$

Conflicting users cannot have common roles  
 ➤  $\text{roles(OE(OE(CU)))} \subset \text{roles(AO(OE(CU)))} = \emptyset$

Users cannot activate two conflicting roles  
 ➤  $\lceil \text{roles(sessions(OE(U)))} \subset \text{OE(CR)} \rceil \leq 1$

Users cannot activate two conflicting roles in a single session  
 ➤  $\lceil \text{roles(OE(sessions(OE(U))))} \subset \text{OE(CR)} \rceil \leq 1$

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## FORMAL SEMANTICS

### ❖ Reduction Algorithm

- to convert a constraint expression to a restricted form of first order predicate logic (RFOPL)

### ❖ Construction Algorithm

- to construct a constraint expression from RFOPL

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## REDUCTION ALGORITHM

$\text{OE(OE(CR))} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright \text{AO(OE(CR))} \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$

1.  $\text{OE(OE(CR))} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{OE(CR)} - \{\text{OE(OE(CR))}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
2. "  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR} : \text{OE(cr)} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{OE(cr)}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
3. "  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR}, " \text{r} \lceil \text{cr} : \text{r} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{r}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
4. "  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR}, " \text{r} \lceil \text{cr}, " \text{u} \lceil \text{U} : \text{r} \lceil \text{roles(u)} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{r}\}) \subset \text{roles(u)} = \emptyset$

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## RFOPL STRUCTURE

### ❖ sequence part : predicate

❖ "  $\text{r} \lceil \text{R}, " \text{u} \lceil \text{U} : \text{r} \lceil \text{roles(u)}$

❖ "  $\text{x}_2 \lceil \text{x}_1, " \text{x}_3 \lceil \text{x}_2, " \text{x}_4 \lceil \text{x}_3 : \text{predicate}$

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## CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM

"  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR}, " \text{r} \lceil \text{cr}, " \text{u} \lceil \text{U} : \text{r} \lceil \text{roles(u)} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{r}\}) \subset \text{roles(u)} = \emptyset$

1. "  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR}, " \text{r} \lceil \text{cr} : \text{r} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{r}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
2. "  $\text{cr} \lceil \text{CR} : \text{OE(cr)} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{cr} - \{\text{OE(cr)}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
3.  $\text{OE(OE(CR))} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright (\text{OE(CR)} - \{\text{OE(OE(CR))}\}) \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$
4.  $\text{OE(OE(CR))} \lceil \text{roles(OE(U))} \triangleright \text{AO(OE(CR))} \subset \text{roles(OE(U))} = \emptyset$

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## SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS

❖ **Theorem 1** Given RCL2000 expression  $\mathbf{a}$ ,  $\mathbf{a}$  can be translated into RFOPL expression  $\mathbf{b}$ . Also  $\mathbf{a}$  can be reconstructed from  $\mathbf{b}$ .

$$C(R(a)) = a$$

❖ **Theorem 2** Given RFOPL expression  $\mathbf{b}$ ,  $\mathbf{b}$  can be translated into RCL2000 expression  $\mathbf{a}$ . Also  $\mathbf{b}'$  which is logically equivalent to  $\mathbf{b}$  can be reconstructed from  $\mathbf{a}$ .

$$R(C(b)) = b'$$

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## SEPARATION OF DUTY CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ Specification of SOD constraints identified by Simon and Zurko (1997) and formulated by Virgil et al (1998)
- ❖ Identify new SOD properties
  - Role-centric
  - User-centric
  - Permission-centric

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## ROLE-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

### ❖ Static SOD

: Conflicting roles cannot have common users

$$U = \{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\}, R = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}, \\ CR = \{cr_1, cr_2\} : cr_1 = \{r_1, r_2, r_3\}, cr_2 = \{r_a, r_b, r_c\}$$

$$\triangleright |roles(OE(U)) \subsetneq OE(CR)| \leq 1$$

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## PERMISSION-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

- ❖ SSOD-CP
  - $|permissions(roles(OE(U))) \subsetneq OE(CP)| \leq 1$
- ❖ Variations of SSOD-CP
  - SSOD-CP  $\bar{\cup}$   
 $|permissions(OE(R)) \subsetneq OE(CP)| \leq 1$

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## USER-CENTRIC SOD CONSTRAINT EXPRESSION

- ❖ SSOD-CU (User-centric)
  - SSOD-CR  $\bar{\cup}$   $|user(OE(CR)) \subsetneq OE(CU)| \leq 1$

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## DYNAMIC SOD

- ❖ User-based DSOD
  - $|roles(sessions(OE(U))) \subsetneq OE(CR)| \leq 1$
- ❖ User-based DSOD with CU
  - $|roles(sessions(OE(OE(CU)))) \subsetneq OE(CR)| \leq 1$
- ❖ Session-based DSOD
  - $|roles(OE(sessions(OE(U)))) \subsetneq OE(CR)| \leq 1$
- ❖ Session-based DSOD with CU
  - $|roles(OE(sessions(OE(OE(CU)))) \subsetneq OE(CR)| \leq 1$

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
## CASE STUDIES

- ❖ Lattice-based access control
  - Ravi Sandhu (1993, 1996)
- ❖ Chinese Wall policy
  - Ravi Sandhu (1992)
- ❖ Discretionary access control
  - Sandhu and Munawer (1998)

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## LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL



- ↳ Subject  $s$  can write object  $o$  only if  $\text{I}(s) \sqsubseteq \text{I}(o)$
- ↳ Subject  $s$  can read object  $o$  only if  $\text{I}(o) \sqsubseteq \text{I}(s)$

**Constraints on UA:** *Each user is assigned to exactly two roles xR and LW*

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## LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

- $\text{AR} = \{\text{ar1}, \text{ar2}\}$ 
  - $\text{ar1}=\{\text{HR}, \text{HW}\}$ ,  $\text{ar2}=\{\text{LR}, \text{LW}\}$
- $\text{ASR} = \{\text{asr1}, \text{asr2}\}$ 
  - $\text{asr1}=\{\text{HR}, \text{LW}\}$ ,  $\text{asr2}=\{\text{LR}, \text{LW}\}$

### ❖ Constraint on UA:

- $\text{roles(OE(U))} = \text{OE(ASR)}$

### ❖ Constraint on sessions:

- $\text{roles(OE(sessions(OE(U))))} = \text{OE(AR)}$

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## PROHIBITION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Forbid the RBAC component from doing (or being) something which is not allowed to do (or be)**
- Separation of duty constraints

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
## OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Force the RBAC component to do (or be) something**
- LBAC-RBAC, Chinese Wall-RBAC simulation

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## CONSTRAINTS CHARACTERIZATION



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## SIMPLE PROHIBITION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Type 1**
  - $\%expr\% \leq 1$
- ❖ **Type 2**
  - $\text{expr} = f$  or  $\%expr\% = 0$
- ❖ **Type 3**
  - $\%expr1\% < \%expr2\%$

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## SIMPLE OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS

- ❖ **Type 1**
  - $\text{expr} \leq 0$  or  $\text{expr} > 0$
- ❖ **Type 2**
  - Set X = Set Y
- ❖ **Type 3**
  - obligation constraints  $\sqsupseteq$  obligation constraints
- ❖ **Type 4**
  - $\text{expr} \leq 1$ 
    - $\text{expr} = 1 \circ \text{expr} \leq 1 \sqcup \text{expr} > 0$

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## CONTRIBUTIONS

- ❖ Developed the first formal and intuitive language for role-based authorization constraints
- ❖ Provided a formal semantics for this language
- ❖ Demonstrated the expressive power of the language by
  - specifying well-known separation of duty constraints
  - identifying new role-based SOD constraints
  - showing how to specify constraints identified in the simulations of other policies in RBAC
- ❖ Characterized role-based constraints into prohibition and obligation constraints

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## FUTURE WORK

- ❖ **Extension of RCL 2000**
  - Applying it the formalization of some realistic security policies
- ❖ **Implementation Issue**
  - Tool for checking syntax and semantic as well as visualization of specification
- ❖ **Enforcement of constraints**

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